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NOTES.
ANTI-TRUST LAW AS APPLIED TO LABOR CASES.

The recent case of Loewe v. Lawlor (208 U. S. 274) OR its
facts presented a boycott of the plaintiff, a hat manufacturer,
by the defendants, members of a vast combination, called the
United Hatters of America. This organization is a part of
the American Federation of Labor, and the boycott was effected
by threatening plaintiff's customers throughout the States With
loss of patronage if they continued to deal with the plaintiff.
The case was held to be within the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 3
and the defendants were required to pay triple damages under
Section 7 of that Act.
-The broad principle upon which the case rests is that the Act
'Act of July 2, i8go.
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applies to combinations of labor as well as capital. This conclusion is based upon the generality of the language of the Act,
in that it embraces "every contract in restraint of trade ;" upon
the fact that during the pendency of the bill in Congress futile
efforts were made to exempt labor organizations from its opera-2
tion; and that in at least one case the point had been decided.
It is manifest that in holding that the Act applied to combinations of labor as well as capital, a principle was laid down
which was much broader than were the facts of the case. The
emphasis is laid upon the combination and not upon the means
employed to effectuate this combination. Thus, although the
means here resorted to was a boycott, yet the decision does not
seem to have been rested upon this ground. It is submitted,
therefore, that the doctrine of our case, that a combination of
labor in restraint of interstate commerce is unlawful, substantially affects the common law rules in trade and labor cases. A
consideration of the scope of this doctrine will make this
apparent.
In our analysis of this doctrine we find these three elements,
all of which must exist in order that the doctrine may apply:
(i) the combination; (2) the restraint; (3) the interstate
commerce; we shall take these up in their order. The combination may be of individuals or groups of individuals, and
may take the form of a contract, an unincorporated association, or a corporation. 3 The "restraint" to be within the
Act need not be an unreasonable one. 4 On the principle
that the fixing of the price of goods embarked in isiterstate commerce by the members of an association inter se,
is unlawful,5 it would seem that the fixing of the price of
labor employed in interstate commerce is also unlawful.
Therefore, it would seem that a strike in pursuance of
such a combination would be within the Act; and that this
would probably also be true in case of a "sympathetic"
strike. Lastly, the restraint must be of interstate in contradistinction to intrastate commerce. Thus, under the principle that the restraint which the Act declares unlawful is
' U. S. v. Workingien's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994; see also
In re Dels. 64 Fed. 724.
2

Addystone Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211; Northern

Securiti-s Case, 193 U. S. 197.
5'Northern Securities Case (supra).
Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38; Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S.
395; Addystone Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S. (supra).
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a restraint upon the transportation and sale, and not upon
the manufacture of goods, 6 it would seem to follow that a
combination, having for its purpose the fixing of the price of
labor in the manufacture of goods within a State, would not
be unlawful; and the same result would probably be reached
even where the defendant had manufactories in several States.
Of course, if, as in the present case, that purpose were effectuated by a means which was a restraint upon the sale of the
goods, the combination would thereby become unlawful.
In view of the decision of the principal case, it is not .surprising that a number of bills are pending in Congress intended
to affect the doctrine of the case-some seeking to annul the
decision, and some merely to modify it. It is in the latter
category that the proposed Hepburn Amendment to the AntiTrust Act is to be placed. It provides that "nothing in the
said Act * * * is intended * * * to interfere with the right
of employees to strike for any cause or combine with each other
or with employers for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
from employers satisfactory terms for their labor or satisfactory conditions of employment."

THE EFFECT OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LIABILITY OF A SURETY.

ACT

ON THE

The first decisions under a uniform code are always to be
watched with interest, upon whatever point they may arise, for
the tendency of the Courts to follow them will be very strong.
Particularly significant are they when bearing upon a fundamental principle of common law. Hence the profession has
read with much thought the opinions of the Supreme Courts of
Maryland and Oregon, delivered in the cases of Vanderford v.
Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank of Westminster, and
Cellers v. Lyons, respectively, and collected in io L. R. A. (N.
S.) 129 and 133. The question arising in these two cases,
which, for purposes of interpreting the Negotiable Instruments
Act was the same, related to the effect of a binding agreement
between the payee of a promissory note and one of two joint
and several makers, to extend the time of payment, without
U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 V. S. i.
'Thus, in hn re Dels, 64 Fed. 724, a combination originally lawful
because not affecting interstatl commerce was held unlawful because
it later did so,
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the knowledge or consent of the other maker, who was on the
note only as a surety, and known to be so by all parties. In
Cellers v. Lyons the defendant, when he signed the note,
had written the word 'surety" after his name; in Vanderford
v. The Bank, the knowledge of his position had come to the
holder in some other way, after the note was given, but it was
clearly proved; as was also the binding agreement for extension of time and the ignorance thereof on the part of the
defendant. Yet in both cases they so construed the Act as to
prevent the discharge of the surety.
The grounds of both decisions are the same. Section 192 of
the Act (as originally numbered) defines the party primarily
liable as one "who, by the terms of the instrument, is absolutely
required to pay the same." These defendants were makers;
a maker is absolutely required to pay the note; therefore, defendants have assumed a primary liability. What, then, said
the Courts, are the defences enumerated in the Act for parties
with primary liability? Section ii declares that "a negotiable instrument is discharged,
(i) By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor;
(2) By payment in due course by the party accommodated,
where the instrument is made or accepted for accommodation;
(3) By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder;
(4) By any other act which will discharge a simple contract
for the payment of money;
(5) When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the
instrument at or after maturity in his own right."
Nowhere in this section, say the Courts, do we find any mention of binding agreements entered into by one of several comakers discharging the others. That provision appears in the
next section, defining the grounds for discharge of a person
secondarily liable; (Section 120, cl. 6). "By any agreement
binding upon the holder to extend the time of payment or to
postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument unless
made with the assent of the party secondarily liable, or unless
the right of recourse against such party is expressly reserved."
This language, in the judgment of the Courts, is exclusive;
it applies to parties secondarily liable and to such only; moreover, one who, by the terms of the instrument, is absolutely
required to pay, may never lay claim to such exemption. The
only defences open to him are those outlined in Section 1i9.
Wherefore, the inevitable conclusion that, however clearly he
may have proved himself a surety, -one who has signed as
accommodation maker may not be thus discharged.

'NOTES

One of the interesting things about these two decisions is,
that the Maryland Court pronounced what was already the rule
in the jurisdiction,' whereas the Supreme Court of Oregon,
in order to arrive at the same conclusion, found it necessary
to reverse the existing law of the State.2 The doctrine arrived
at by these Courts was the rule of the early decisions, before
equitable defenses were permitted in courts of law,3 as a
necessary result of the principle that parol evidence could
not be introduced to vary the terms of a written instrument.
But with the introduction of equitable defenses into actions at
law, the doctrine was repudiated, and the surety allowed to
plead notice on the part of the creditors of his real position
on the instrument. 4 Once this step was taken, it was easy to
apply the ordinary rules of suretyship, and in the great majority of jurisdictions the accommodation maker was dischargeable under the exact facts of the cases before us.5 A few
States, including Maryland, adhered to the older doctrine, 6
and in these, of course, the Act has wrought no change,7 but
be safely laid down that the accepted rule was the other
it may
8
way.
Not the least interesting thing about these decisions is the
fact that such an interpretation was foreseen and warned
against by Mr. Ames in his famous controversy with Brewster
when the Act was passed. He says, ("Comments and Criticisms upon the Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 Harvard
Law Review, 241"), with reference to Section 120 sub-sections 5 and 6, that "another sub-section should be added, to the
effect that an accommodation acceptor or maker, although the
party primarily liable on the instrument, will be discharged
if the holder, with knowledge of the accommodation, releases,
or by a valid agreement undertakes to give time to the accommodated drawer or indorser." And he adds: "The authorities
are almost unanimous on this point also, although in a few
jurisdictions the accommodation party must resort to equity
'Yates
v. Donaldson, 5 Md., 389 (1854).
2
Findley v. Hill, 8 Or. 247 (i88o).
S2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Sec. 1334; Fenturn v. Pocock, 5
Taunton 192 (1813).
'Pooley v. Havadine, 7 El. and El. 431 (1857).
*Baily v. Edwards, 4 Best and Smith 761 (1864); Hubbard v. Gurcy, 64 N. Y. App. 457 (1876).
SDelaware Co. Trust Co. v. Title Ins. Co., igg Pa. 17 (19O1).
'Crawford on The Negotiable Instruiments Law of Pennsylvania, p.
10.
87

Cyc. Law and Proc. 882.
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for his relief." The failure to add the sub-section recommended
by him rendered possible, and perhaps inevitable, the conclusion
reached in these 19o7 decisions.
I say "perhaps inevitable," for a possible way out has been
indicated by Mr. Thomas A. Street in a brief note on these
same cases in the eleventh volume of Law Notes, page 105.
He criticises the decisions in unmistakeable terms, and points
out that the introduction of Clause 4 in Section n19--"by any
other Act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money;"--contemplated the arising of situations unprovided for by a definite section of the Statute, and rendered
possible their decision upon common law principles. This, he
says, is such a situation. This clause was apparently not
dwelt upon in either argument; perhaps it may yet have its
effect upon the Courts. The only other Court which has
passed upon the question, so far as the writer can discover, is
the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of National Citizens' Bank v. Toplitz, 81 N. Y. Supp. 422 (I9O3), in which the
same interpretation was rendered. The case has not the authority of the Court of Appeals, however, which refused to rule
upon this very question, giving judgment upon another point
in the pleading.
Mr. Street ends his article with a short but cogent invective
against what he calls smooth but dangerous defining clauses
(of the nature of Section 192), in all uniform codes, which
clog the free play of judicial interpretation. Certainly if such
a clause permits a construction contrary to the design of the
draughtsmen9 and subversive of a fundamental and generally
accepted rule of the common law, the moral is not without its
point.

REsTRIcTIONs UPON THE USE OF LAND.
A covenant running with the land at law must be under seal;
privity of estate is required; and it is immaterial whether the
subsequent transferees have notice or not. Those agreements,
which run with the land only in equity, termed restrictions,
require neither seal nor privity, and notice is essential. In
actions upon covenants (i) between the original parties, and
(2) by or against transferees; and in actions upon restrictions
(3) between the original parties-but not (4) by or against

'See address of A. M. Eaton-Reports of American Bar Association
for I9o7-page 1164.
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transferees-there is a concurrent remedy at law and in
equity. In all these three cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the
question is always one of contracts; and the remedy in equity
is always a question of the specific performance of contracts.
Whether the burden is negative or affirmative' equity will. grant
relief, either against the original party or his transferee,' if
the contract is such as equity can specifically enforce. In the
fourth class of actions above-actions upon restrictions by or
against transferees-there is no concurrent jurisdiction. The
remedy in equity is exclusive. Nor is it based upon contract. It
is not a question of specific performance, but of constructive
trusts. Unless a holder is a purchaser for value and without
notice, 2 he is bound as is a purchaser of land from one who has
previously contracted to sell it. He takes a res in which another
has an equity, and the obligation is constructively fastened
upon him. In order that there be such an equity in the land,
the agreement (i) must concern the use of the land; (2) it
must be intended to bind future owners ;3 and (3) it must be
one which equity has power specifically to enforce. In England the doctrine has been limited to negative burdens,4 although as against the promisor, it is held to be immaterial
whether the burden is affirmative5 or negative. Since in England it is apparently the law, that the burden of a covenant running with the land, made by the owner of a fee simple with one
other than his lessee, will not run so as to be enforceable against
a transferee of the land,' there is never any remedy in England
upon any agreement concerning land against a transferee, unless
there can be a remedy by injunction-with the exception of
the burden of a spurious easement, and of a charge upon land.7
Both of the Ltter are held to run, and both impose amrmative
duties. But in America the prevailing rule is that the burden
of a covenant runs as well as the benefit,8 and equity will
'Countryman v. Deck,

13

Abb. New Cas. io (z883).

'Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774 (848).
'Cf. Norcross v. James, 14o Mass. 188 (1885) ; Brown v. Marshall,
ig N. J. Eq. 537 (1868).
'Haywood v. Brunsick Bldg. Soc., L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 403 (88i) ; Cf.
Hood v. North Eastern R. R., L. R., 8 Eq., Cas. 666 (1869).
'Storer v. Great Western Ry. Co., 2 Y. & C. C. 48 (1842).
'Keppel v. Bailey, 2 Mlyln. & K 517 (1834); Austerberry v. Corp. of
Oldham, 29 Chan. Div. 750 (1885).
'Morland v. Cook, L. R. 6 Eq. 252 (1868) as explained in Austerberry v. Corp. of Oldham, supra.
'Electric City Land & Improvement Co. v. West Ridge Coal Co.,

i87 Pa. 5oo (8W).
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enforce an affirmative burden against the transferee.1 If the
doctrine of constructive trusts is the true basis of allowing the
burden of a restriction to run, it should also be immaterial
whether it is affirmative or negative. If the contract is one
that equity has power specifically to enforce, there is an equity
in land in one case just as 'much as in the other. There is the
same probability in one as in the other that the transferee paid
less because of the burden-an unjust enrichment in each case.
Unless there is some rule of policy, preventing the burdening
of successive holders with the performance of affirmative acts
for the benefit of others, those American courts which refuse
to follow the English limitations, must be considered to have
adopted the sounder rule.9
As to who is entitled to the benefit of the restriction, depends
upon the intentions of the parties. Where the intentions are
not expressed, it is a question of construction. Policy favors
encumbering the land as little as possible; and therefore, unless
a contrary intention appears, the benefit will be construed as
personal to the promisee. 10 Prior grantees of the promisee may
enforce the restriction against subsequent grantees, if it is
clearly shown that it was so intended. This generally happens
when land is divided up into lots, and laid out according to a
general plan, and each lot is sold subject to the restrictions in
that plan.11 But if it appears that the restrictions were only
intended for the benefit of the promisee, or land still retained
by him, even though there were agreements between the promisee and each grantee, prior grantees will not be allowed the
benefit of restrictions in subsequent grants.12 If the intention
is clearly expressed, there should be no reason why a restriction
should not ensue to the benefit of an occupant of land never
owned by the promisee. When the restriction benefits adjoining land, owned by the promisee, there is a presumption that
it was for the benefit of this land, and subsequent holders can
enforce it.'8 The assignmer.t of the contract of restriction is
presumed, when the land, to which it is attached, is assigned;
'Gould v. Partridge,52 N. Y. App. Div. 4o (I900).
"Badger v. Broadman, I6 Gray (Mass.) 559; Keates v. Lyon, L. R. 4
Chan. App. 218 (I869).
'Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 351 (1840).
'Jewell v. Lee, 14 Allen (Mass.) 145 (1867); Sharp v. Ropes, IiO

Mass. 381

(1892).

"Peck v. Conway, irg Mass. 546 (1875); Wilson v. Mass. Inst.
Technology, 75 N. E. Rep. (Mass.) 128 (i9oo). Cf. Keates v. Lyon,
supra.
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and the grantee gets the benefit of it whether he had notice of
it or not.14
In a recent case land was conveyed to a canal company on
condition that it construct a basin upon the land conveyed.
The consideration was "the benefit which would result" to the
grantors, "as owners of said land, by cutting the canal through,
and erecting the said work, etc." The grantors erected a mill
on the part retained, and for seventy years the basin was used
by the grantors and their transferees as a place for loading and
unloading vessels. A railroad acquired the land with notice,
and constructed its road through the basin. The Court said
that relief would have been granted upon the doctrine of Tulk
v. Moxhay, were the original grantors bringing the bill; but
denied relief to the subsequent grantees, because there was no
reservation of an easement in fee, due to lack of words of
inheritance, and because there was no covenant running with
the land. Dawson v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 68 At. Rep.
(Md.) 301, Dec., 19o7. 1 Whether the benefit was intended to
be personal to the promisee, was not discussed. There may
have been laches or acquiescence. 6 If the subsequent grantee
was not entitled to the use of the basin, the purpose of the
restriction could be considered to have failed, and therefore the
burden should not be enforced. 17 In Massachusetts, where the
same doctrine as to reservations is held, an opposite decision
was reached, upon analogous facts.' 8

"REVIVAL" OF A "REvOKED" WILL.

One of the most mooted questions of the law of wills is the
question of the so-called "revival" of a will "revoked" by an
express statement to that effect in a later will, the revoking
instrument being subsequently destroyed. The courts in England early differed as to the effect of such an act, the ecclesiastical courts holding that the question was one entirely of intention to be decided according to all the facts and circumstances
of each particular case and to determine this question admitted
14

Child v. Douglass, Kay 56o (1854)

and see Rogers v. Hosegood

(19oo) 2 Ch. 388, p. 4o6.
'Cf.
Hood v. North Eastern R. R., supra.
1 Whitney v. Union Ry., ii Gray (Mass.) 359

('858).

"Duke
of Bedford v. British Museum, 2 M. & R. 552 (1822).
' 5Bailey v. Agawan Nat. Bank, 76 N. E. Rep. (Mass.) 449 (19oi).
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parol evidence,' while the common law courts held 2 that the
second will never revoked the first, a will being in its very
nature merely intentional and inoperative till the testator's
death.3 A similar difference of opinion has existed in this
country. In Pennsylvania 4 it has been held that the presumption is in favor of a "revival" of the first will unless a contrary intention can be shown by contemporary declarations of
the testator (res gesta). In Massachusetts 5 a wider latitude
is allowed and the question being wholly one of intention subsequent parol declarations of the testator are as freely admitted
as they were in the English ecclesiastical courts. On the other
hand, in Michigan 8 it has been laid down as a positive rule of
law that the destruction of a revoking will can never operate
to revive the revoked will-the revocation in such cases taking
place from the time of the excution of the revoking instrument
-and parol evidence is inadmissable to show a contrary intent.
In the recent case of Bates v. Hacking 7 a diametrically opposite decision was reached, largely on the authority of Goodright
v. Glazier,8 which the court cited with approval and followed.
It was held that a clause of revocation in a will could have no
effect till the date of the testator's death, it partaking of the
ambulatory nature of the rest of the will and hence the destruction of a will containing a clause of revocation could have no
effect on a prior will, the latter never having be~en revoked.
The decision 9 has much to commend it. The Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts rules (affected as they were by the rulings
of the English ecclesiastical courts) seem clearly wrong, since
to admit parol evidence-even though it be part of the res
gesta-seems to be a clear violation of the Statute of Wills
' Moore v. Moore, i Phillim. 375; Usticke v. Barden, 2 Addams II6.
2 Goodrightv. Glazier, 4 Burrows 2512 (1776).
:The question was finally settled in England by the Wills Act, 7 Win.
IV, and I Vict. C. 26, Sec. 22, under which it has been held that no
will or codicil revoked by a clause to that effect in a subsequent will can
be revived by the destruction of such revoking will or codicil.
"Flintham v. Bradford, io Pa. 82 (1848).
'Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252 (1883).
"Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241 (1881) ; Cheever v. North, io6 Mich.

290 (1895).

'68 Atl. 622 .(Decided Dec. 3o, 1907. Rehearing Jan. 28, 19o8).
8

Supra.

It is interesting to note that in Goodright v. Glazier (supra)
the reports do not clearly indicate whether or not an express clause
of revocation existed in the second will. Subsequent decisions in
quoting the case have, however, generally assumed the existence of
such a clause.

NOTES

349

requiring testamentary instruments to be in writing. The argument against the Michigan rule is that it practically divides one
instrument-with one signature and one attestation-into two:
one, the clause of revocation, which takes effect immediately,
and the other, the rest of the will, which has no effect till the
testator's death. Were the clause relied on for the revocation
put in a separate instrument there would, of course, be no doubt
as to its immediate operation, and the Michigan courts hold the
fact that it is put into a will ought not to effect its character.
Certainly, it would seem that the term "revival" is a misnomer (except in jurisdictions which admit parol evidence),
since if a will is once revoked it would seem it could not be
reinstated without complying with the terms of the statute. If
it has never been revoked by the second will, of course there
can be no revival, the effect of the original will never having
been altered. Had the second will been one merely inconsistent
in substance with the first and contained no express clause of
revocation, the first would in no case be revoked till the testator's death and hence no question of revival could arise? In
Bates v. Hacking 7 there was a statute specifying the methods
by which a will might be revoked. That revocation by a clause
to that effect in a subsequent will was one of the methods enumerated was held immaterial in determining the question as to
the time when such revocation clause took effect.

